Let h and g be polynomials of bounded Euclidean norm in the ring Z[X]/ X n + 1 . Given polynomial [h/g]q ∈ Zq[X]/ X n + 1 , the NTRU problem is to find a, b ∈ Z[X]/ X n + 1 with small Euclidean norm such that [a/b]q = [h/g]q. We propose an algorithm to solve the NTRU problem which runs in 2 O(n/ log 2− q) time for some 0 < < 2 when g , h and g −1 are in some range. The main technique of our algorithm is to reduce a problem on a field to one in a subfield. Recently, the GGH scheme, the first candidate of a (approximate) multilinear map, was known to be insecure by the Hu-Jia attack using encodings of zero, but no polynomial time attack was known without them. Our algorithm can be directly applied to construct level-0 encodings of zero and so utilized to attack the GGH scheme without encodings of zero in polynomial time of its security parameter.
Introduction
The NTRU problem is to find a pair of small polynomial whose ratio matches up to given a ratio of two small polynomials [HPS98] . After introduced for the security of a public key encryption scheme NTRU, the assumption that this NTRU problem is to be hard to solve, so-called NTRU assumption, has been used for the security grounding of various cryptographic schemes such as signature schemes [HHGP + 03, DDLL13] , fully homomorphic encryption [LATV12, BLLN13] and candidates for cryptographic multi-linear maps [GGH13, LSS14, ACLL14] . Not broken until now, the NTRU assumption is getting more attention as one of the candidates for the post-quantum public-key crypto system. A variant of NTRU problem can be stated as follows:
Problem 1 (A variant of NTRU Problem) Let φ n (X) ∈ Z[X] be a polynomial of degree n, q ∈ Z be an integer, and let D, N and B be real numbers. The NTRU Problem N T RU φn,q,D,N,B is to find a, b ∈R := Z[X]/ φ n (X) with Euclidean norm smaller than B such that [b/a] q = f for given a polynomial f = [h/g] q , where h and g are sampled from R and have Euclidean norms bounded by D and N , respectively.
In the original NTRU problem, h and g are sampled from the some distribution of R. We consider the variant version to attack multilinear maps [GGH13] .
In this paper, we propose a polynomial time reduction from N T RU φn,q,D,N,B into N T RU φ n/2 ,q,D1,N1,B1 where φ n = X n + 1, B = min{ q 2D √ n , q 2N √ n }, D 1 = D 2 n/2, N 1 = 2N D n/2, and B 1 = min{ q 2Dt √ n , q 2Nt √ n , q 2nN 2 g −1 √ n } for a power n of 2. Our algorithm is to reduce the problem defined over a ring Z[X]/ X n +1 to one over a subring Z[X]/ X n/2 +1 . After applying repeatedly, we then use lattice reduction algorithms to find a short element. Since the latter has smaller dimension, lattice reduction algorithms require less running time to produce a short element, which results in an algorithm on the NTRU problem. It runs in 2 O(n/ log 2− q) time for some 0 < < 2 when g , h and g −1 are in some range. For example, when n = λ 2 and log q = λ, the running time is of polynomial in λ.
As an application of our work, we propose an attack of the GGH multilinear maps [GGH13] without any encodings of zero. The GGH maps were proposed by Garg et al. and broken by so called a zeroizing attack by Hu and Jia [HJ15] . Since their attack extensively utilizes encodings of zero, it does not work without them and no polynomial time attack was known without them until recently (Refer to the related work subsection for concurrent and independent works on this problem). Our algorithm can be directly applied to construct level-0 encodings of zero. We then can utilize them to attack the GGH scheme without encodings of zero in polynomial time of its security parameter. Our GGH attack requires one known plaintext/ciphertext pair as well as public parameters.
Technical overview. A natural approach for the NTRU problem is to convert it to a Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) in an ideal lattice. Let φ n (X) = X n + 1 when n is a power of 2. For any polynomial f = [h/g] q = n−1 i=0 f i X i ∈ R := Z[X]/ X n + 1 , one may consider it as a vector (f 0 , · · · , f n−1 ) T . Then, the product gf = n−1 i=0 g i X i f of two polynomials f and g in R is contained in a lattice M f generated by {f , Xf , · · · , X n−1 f }. We aim to obtain an element g ∈ Z[X]/ φ(X) satisfying g and [gf ] q are small. To obtain such ag ∈ Z[X]/ φ(X) , one can naturally contemplate the following column lattice:
where I is the identity matrix of size n and M f is a basis matrix of M f juxtaposed by {f , Xf , · · · , X n−1 f }.
Therefore, if one can find a small lattice point u such that
it becomes a solution of N T RU φ,q,D,N,B . However, the dimension 2n of the lattice is too large for most applications, where the hardness of the NTRU problem comes from.
To overcome this obstacle, we consider a subfield K m of K 0 := Q[X]/ X n +1 with extension degree m, and the trace of f ∈ K 0 over K m :
Since the numerator and denominator are elements in K m bounded by m h · g m−1 n m and g m n m , respectively, if they are smaller than q, we can draw another instance of the NTRU problem on K m , where the dimension of Λ Tr(f ) is that of Λ f divided by m. Optimizing the m so that finding a small vector of the reduced lattice is possible with BKZ algorithm, one can reach the our results.
Multilinear Maps. After Boneh and Silverberg [BS02] suggested a concept of cryptographic multilinear maps and their applications such as multipartite Diffie-Hellman and an efficient broadcast encryption in 2002, it has been a long lasting open question to construct cryptographic multilinear maps. In 2013, after about one decade, approximate cryptographic multilinear maps are first proposed by Garg, Gentry, and Halevi (GGH) [GGH13] . Not much later, second and third cryptographic multilinear maps are suggested by Coron, Lepoint, and Tibouchi (CLT) [CLT13] , and Craig Gentry, Sergey Gorbunov, and Shai Halevi [GGH15], respectively. However, none of them have a reduction to standard hardness problem such as subset sum problem. In fact, the first two schemes with low level encodings of zero are known to be insecure [CHL + 15,HJ15], so called zeroizing attack. The last candidate is also broken [Cor15] . Although the fixed scheme of [CLT13] is proposed by the same authors of [CLT15] to resist zeroizing attack against the CLT scheme, it is also shown to be insecure [CLR15] .
On the other hand, both [GGH13] scheme and [CLT13] scheme without any encodings of zero, which are used as basic tools for constructing applications such as indistinguishable obfuscations, have still not been analyzed yet.
Related work. Recently for GGH multilinear maps without encodings of zero, two more concurrent and independent cryptanalytic works have been announced simultaneously: One by Albrecht, Bai, and Ducas [MA16] and the other by Miles, Sahai, and Zhandry [MSZ16] .
The first introduces a very similar reduction from N T RU φn,q,D,N,B into N T RU φ n/2 ,q,D1,N1,B1 . But they used the norm function instead of the trace function in our algorithm and so happened to have larger N 1 than ours, when N > 2D. That results in quantum polynomial time or subexponential time attack on GGH without encodings of zero. However, they provided rich analysis for NTRU-like homomorphic encryptions LTV [LATV12] and YASHE [BLLN13] , and multilinear maps GGH with some implementations.
The second introduces a polynomial time attack algorithm against the GGH multilinear maps, so called annihilation attacks. Using non-linear polynomials, it also leads to a polynomial time break of the GGH scheme without low level encodings of zero.
Organization. In Section 2, we introduce some notations and preliminaries related to ideal theory and Galois theory. In Section 3, we state useful properties and their proof used to solve the N T RU problem. In Section 4, we explain the GGH scheme briefly and present our algorithm to attack the GGH scheme using our theorem.
Preliminaries
Notation. For an integer q, we use the notations Z q := Z/(qZ) and R q :=
We extend this map into R q applying to each coefficient. By abuse of notation, we omit this ι unless confused to identify [x] q ∈ Z q with an integer x when − q 2 < x ≤ q 2 . Throughout this paper, we assume that an integer n is a power of 2. Then K := Q[X]/ X n +1 is a number field with the ring of integers R := Z[X]/ X n + 1 . Especially, K is a Galois extension of Q and we denote by Gal(K/Q) the Galois group of K over Q. As in technical overview, for any polynomial f = n−1 i=0 f i X i ∈ K, we consider it as a column vector (f 0 , · · · , f n−1 ) T . When we need an inverse of element a ∈ R, we usually consider the inverse in K with notation a −1 . If we want to consider it in R q not in K, then we denote it by a −1 q . We use bold letters to denote vectors or ring elements in Z n or R.
Ideal
Lattice. An n-dimension full-rank lattice M ⊂ R n is the set of all Zlinear combinations of n linearly independent vectors. Let det(M) denote the determinant of lattice M. For an element g ∈ R, we denote by g be the principal ideal in R generated by g, whose basis consists of {g, Xg, . . . , X n−1 g}. By identifying a polynomial g = g i X i ∈ R with a vector (g n−1 , g n−2 , . . . , g 0 ) T in Z n , we can apply a lattice theory to the algebraic ring R and an algebraic ring theory to the ideal lattice g .
For a polynomial u ∈ R and a basis B := {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n }, we denote by u mod B the reduction of u modulo the fundamental region of lattice
Next, we introduce useful lemmas related to ideal lattices.
Proof. The k-th coefficient of ab is of the form:
Using Lemma 2, if one can find the c satisfying lemma 2, c is of the form c = dg for some small d ∈ Z[X]/ X n + 1 . Then multiplying it to [hg −1 ] q , one can obtain, a small multiple of h, dh. Hence, dh and dg become a solution of NTRU problem.
Gaussian distribution. Given σ > 0, the discrete Gaussian distribution over the set L with zero mean is defined as D L,σ (x) = ρ σ (x)/ρ σ (L) for any x ∈ L, where ρ σ (x) = exp(−π x 2 /σ 2 ), ρ σ (L) = x∈L ρ σ (x). We use a notation a ← D to denote choosing an element a according to the distribution of D.
Norm and Trace of Field For a finite extension K of a field F , the trace Tr K/F (α) and norm N K/F (α) of α ∈ K over F is defined as the trace and determinant of the linear transformation M α which maps x ∈ K to αx ∈ K respectively, i.e, Tr K/F (α) = a i,i and N K/F (α) = det(a i,j ) where a i,j is the matrix for M α with respect to any base of K over F . The map Tr K/F and N K/F satisfy the following properties:
for α, β ∈ K and a ∈ F .
Main Theorem
In this section we introduce how we can reduce NTRU problem with a given input [h/g] q into NTRU problem with an input whose denominator and numerator have the half degree of h and g. Throughout this section, let n = 2 s , and denote Q[X 2 t ]/ X n +1 and Z[X 2 t ]/ X n +1 by K t and R t , respectively, with 0 ≤ t ≤ s.
Since K 0 is a Galois extension field of K 1 with degree 2, Gal(K 0 /K 1 ) is a group of order 2. That is, Gal(K 0 /K 1 ) = {id, σ} satisfying σ(X) = −X and so σ 2 = id where id is the identity map. For an element f , g ∈ R ⊂ K 0 , the following elements are contained in R 1 ⊂ K 1 :
since these are fixed by the Gal(K 0 /K 1 ). Note that these elements have only n/2 terms and the last one lies in 2 · R 1 .
Generally, for 0 < t ≤ s, K 0 is a Galois extension field of K t with degree 2 t and the Galois group G t :
since these are fixed by the Gal(K 0 /K t ). Moreover, these elements have only n/2 t terms and the last one lies in 2 t · R t . Using this property, we can get the following theorem which is the main theorem in this paper.
Theorem 1 Let q and m ∈ Z be integers, and let D, and N be positive real
Then, for φ n (X) = X n + 1 with n = 2 s and 0 < t ≤ s, we can reduce N T RU φn,q,D,N,B into N T RU φ n/2 t ,q,Dt,Nt,Bt where
Proof. Suppose we are given [h/g] q where g and h are sampled from the set {(g, h) ∈ R 2 = (Z[X]/ φ n (X) ) 2 : h < N, g < D}. We consider an useful element
in K t satisfying:
Therefore, we can see
Moreover, since g and h are relative prime with high probability [MA16] , we assume the coprimality of g and h. Then, by Lemma 2 , a t is of the form a t = d
Then, we can conclude that the pair (a, b) is a solution of N T RU φn,q,D,N,B with following properties:
The last inequality implies b = dh
Thus, we get the desired result.
Theorem 2 Let q be an integer, n be a power of 2, and λ be a security parameter. Let f = [h/g] q be an instance of N T RU φn,q,D,N,B problem with setting log q = λ , n ≤ λ 2 +1 , N = q a , 0 < a < 1/2, D = λ k < N , g −1 < λ 2 , φ n (X) = X n + 1, and B = min{ q
and n t = n 2 t , then the problem is solved in 2 O(β) time. In particular, B t = q 2N t √ n and β = n log 2− q , for some 0 < < 2, the problem is solved in 2 O(n/log 2− q) time.
For example, when n = λ 2 , D = λ 2 , N = q 1/8 , and log q = λ, one can solve the N T RU φn,q,D,N,B in polynomial time in λ. In case of n = λ 3 , D = λ 2 , N = q 1/8 , and log q = λ, one can solve the problem in 2Õ (λ) time.
Proof. By Theorem 1, one can obtain a new instance [Tr
√ nt , q nN 2 g −1 }. Now, we consider the following column lattice M t :
where I nt is the identity matrix of size n t = n/2 t and Λ t ∈ Z nt×nt is a matrix whose i-th column is ι(X i2 t [Tr K/Kt ([h/g] q /2 t ] q )) for 0 ≤ i < n/2 t . In other
Using the BKZ algorithm with block size β, one can obtain an element in M t u t = (u 0 , · · · , u nt−1 , u nt , · · · , u 2nt−1 ) T with u t ≤ 2β
then c and c · Tr K/Kt ([h/g] q )] q satisfy
In other words, c satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2. Therefore, c is in N K/Kt (g) ⊂ g . Note that c is of the form c = d · N K/Kt (g) = d g ∈ R t . Finally, we have constructed an algorithm to find an element c = dN K/Kt (g) with the size of it smaller than
By multiplying c to f = [h/g] q , one can obtain an element [dhN K/Kt (g)g −1 ] q . Since the Euclidean size of dhN K/Kt (g)g −1 is smaller than Running time of this procedure is dominated by that of BKZ algorithm with block size β, which is poly(n, log q) · C HKZ (β) times where C HKZ (β) = 2 O(β) is the cost of HKZ-reduction in dimension β [ADRSD14,HPS11].
Hence, if there exist β > 0 and t ∈ Z satisfying equation (1), one can solve the N T RU φn,q,N,D,B .
Since
√ n , to check the above condition of β and t is satisfied, we have the equivalence equation:
To optimize the left hand side of inequality, we choose t such that t = log n log β 2(β − 1)(log nλ k /2) .
Then the left hand side is asymptotic to the following:
where the last approximation comes from the arithmetic-geometric mean. It implies that if one choose β = n (log q) 2− , for some 0 < < 2, then the last value is smaller than (1/2 − a)log q asymptotically. Hence, one can hold the results.
Application to GGH
In this section, we explain an attack algorithm to solve the GDDH problem of GGH scheme without low level encodings of zero.
The GGH Scheme
First, we briefly recall the Garg et al. construction. We refer to the original paper [GGH13] for a complete description. The scheme relies on the following parameters.
λ: the security parameter κ: the multilinearity parameter q: the modulus of a ciphertext n: the dimension of base ring m: the number of level-κ encodings of zero in public parameters σ: the basic Gaussian parameter for drawing the ideal generator g σ : the Gaussian parameter for sampling level-zero elements σ * : the Gaussian parameter for constructing nonzero level elements Instance generation: (params, p zt ) ← InstGen(1 λ , 1 κ ).
For given λ and κ, determine the parameter (σ, σ , q, n) to satisfy the above conditions and output (params, p zt ).
Sample g ← D R,σ until g , g −1 ≤ n 2 and I = g is a prime ideal in R. Publish params = (n, q, κ, {x i }) and p zt .
Sampling level-zero encodings: a ← samp(params). Sample a ← D I,σ .
Encodings at higher levels: c i ← enc(params, i, c).
Given a level-j encoding c for j < i,
Adding and multiplying encodings: Given two encodings c 1 and c 2 of same level, the addition of c 1 and c 2 is computed by Add(c 1 , c 2 )=[c 1 + c 2 ] q . Given two encodings c 1 and c 2 , we multiply c 1 and c 2 by Mul(c 1 , c 2 )=[c 1 · c 2 ] q . 
Hardness Assumptions
We recall the definition of the Graded Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (GDDH) and Graded Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (GCDH) on which the security of GGH scheme relies [GGH13] . These do not seem to be reducible to more classical assumptions in generic ways.
GDDH, ext-GCDH, GCDH.
For an adversary A and parameters λ, κ, we consider the following process in the GGH scheme.
The GCDH problem is to output a level-κ encoding of The ext-GCDH problem is to output a v ∈ R q such that [v − p zt ·û] q < q 3/4 given inputs {q, {x i }, p zt , u 0 , . . . , u κ }.
The GDDH problem is to distinguish between two distributions D DDH and D R where
Attack to GGH
Considering GGH13, one can notice that the theorem in section 3 can be applied to solve the GCDH problem, which is the security problem of the GGH scheme. More precisely, suppose we have {q, {x i }, p zt , u 0 , · · · , u κ }.
Additionally, we assume that we have a pair of level-0 encodingm / ∈ g and its level-1 encoding b = m + ag z q . Our attack algorithm consists of three steps:
-First, find a small element cg ∈ g .
-Next, compute a small level-1 encoding ofm −1 using them, cg -Last, recover a element F in R = Z[X]/ X n + 1 such that F − m 0 ∈ g .
Finally, we can compute m , which is a level-κ encoding of κ i=0 m i + g using F , u i , and x 1 . Then it becomes a solution of GCDH problem. In this paper, we assume σ = n 2 .5 and σ * = n 3 .
4.3.1
Step 1: Finding a small element of g Note that m + αg , b i g , a i ≤ σ * √ n ≤ n 3.5 and m ≤ σ √ n ≤ n 3 with overwhelming probability. For convenience, we use the notation G t to denote Gal(K/K t ).
the size of denominator and numerator is bounded by n 3.5κ √ n κ−1 < n 4κ and n 3.5 , respectively.
Using the algorithm of Theorem 2 to several [a I /b i g] q := [a i1 · · · a iκ /b j g] q , for I = [i 1 , · · · , i κ ], i 1 , · · · , i κ ∈ {0, · · · , κ} and j ∈ {1, · · · , m}, one can recover several multiples
can easily see that {δ(A I,j )} δ∈Gt\{id} only have a common factor g. Therefore, using {δ(A I,j )} δ∈Gt\{id} , we recover a basis matrix of the ideal lattice of g . Using N K/Kt (a) for a ∈ g , which is a multilple of N K/Kt (g), one can also recover a basis matrix of the ideal lattice of N K/Kt (g) . Now, using β block-BKZ algorithm [HPS11] , one can obtain an element cg ∈ N K/Kt (g) such that cg ≤ 2β n t −1 2(β−1) + 3 2 · n 2 t+1 , which has a optimized value smaller than 2β 2 n log β n (β − 1) + 3 2 when t = 1 2 log n 2β log β n .
4.3.2
Step 2: Computing a small level-1 encoding ofm −1 Using a pair m, b = m + ag z q , one can recover a level-1 encoding of 1 as follows. Since we know a basis matrix of g , one can computeê such that em +ê cg = 1 for someê ∈ R. Then, e := (ê mod cg) and e κ := (ê κ mod cg) are the inverses ofm andm κ in R/ g , respectively. Moreover, these size are smaller than cg n/2.
Step 3: Computing the m
We refer to Section 6.3.3 in [GGH13] to solve the GCDH problem with short vector cg ∈ g . We explain how to use cg in order to solve the GCDH problem in the GGH scheme. First, by applying Theorem 2 to b κ /x 1 = (m + ag) κ /b 1 g, one can obtain d(m + ag) κ and db 1 g. Now compute G ∈ R such that d(m + ag) κ − Gdb 1 g = d(m + ag) κ mod db 1 g and also compute b = b κ − Gx 1 . Similarly, compute G ∈ R such that b = b κ−1 u 0 − G x 1 . By using u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u κ , cg, b, e, e κ , and p zt , one can obtain the following zero-testing values f and f 0 :
Since the size of f is smaller than cg 2 · n/2 · b 1 g · n/2 · h g −1 · n 2 ≤ 4β 4· n log β n (β − 1) +3 n 9 √ q, it is asymptotically smaller than q/2 when β = λ 1−γ for some 0 < γ < 1 and f is actually e κ · (m + ag) κ mod b 1 g · h · c in R. Then f is of the form (1 + J g)hc for some J ∈ R. On the same condition, f 0 has the same bound and is of the form (m 0 + J g)hc for some J ∈ R.
Assuming that f has an inverse in R/ (g) , we can compute F := f 0 /f = m 0 mod g . Then, F is a lelvel-0 enconding of m 0 . Note that we are given a top level encoding of zero,
. Using the alogirhm of Theorem 2 to
It is of the form F · d κ i=1 a i − Gdb 1 g for some G ∈ R. Since d is the common factor, it is same to d · ((F · κ i=1 u i ) mod b 1 g)= d · (F · κ i=1 a i − Gb 1 g). We remark that the size of (F · κ i=1 a i ) mod b 1 g is bounded by b 1 g n < n 5 and it is an element of a coset κ i=0 m i + g . Now compute F · κ i=1 u i − Gx 1 . Then it has the following form
By the above mention, its numerator is in the coset κ i=0 m i + g and the size of it is bounded n 5 . Hence it is the valid level-κ encoding of κ i=0 m i and we solve the GCDH problem. In summary, we can get the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Given {n, q, {x i }, m, b, p zt , u 0 , · · · , u κ } of the GGH scheme parameters, where n is Θ(λ 2 ), log q = Θ(λ), x i is a level-κ encoding of zero, m is a level-0 nonzero encoding, b is a level-1 encoding of m and u i is a level-1 encoding of m i , one can take some 0 < < 2 and 0 < γ < 1 assymtoticaly which leads to compute an enc κ ( κ i=0 m i ) which is a solution of GCDH problem in the GGH scheme in the max{2 O(n/ log 2− q) , 2 O(λ 1−γ ) }.
Conclusion
After GGH scheme providing encoding of zero is known to be insecure, the variant of NTRU has received a lot of attention because of the security grounding of GGH scheme without encoding of zero. In this work, we described how to find a small solution of the variant of NTRU using reduction technique. By applying the method to GGH scheme, we could attack the GCDH problem in GGH scheme. Therefore, our results imply that there is no guarantee for the security of the GGH scheme not only when we are given a small encoding of zero but also when we are not given.
